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I. Introduction
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
issues patents as a means of protecting the intellectual property for
the inventors of medical devices such as hip arthroplasty implants
that fulfill the requirement of being both useful1 and novel.2
However, patents are issued for these devices prior to undergoing
regulatory evaluation by the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to establish their safety and their
effectiveness. Furthermore, one of the main mechanisms the FDA
has utilized for the evaluation of safety and effectiveness is the
510(k) process, which allows regulatory approval based on a device
being “substantially equivalent” to a device that had previously been
granted FDA approval. 3 Consequently, the USPTO is providing
patent protection for medical devices that have not had their utility
established because their safety and clinical effectiveness have not
been confirmed by the regulatory process, and their novelty is
questionable because the regulatory approval relies upon a
demonstration of “substantial equivalence” 4 to a previously
approved implantable device. The problem with the current timeline
of the patent process and subsequent regulatory evaluation of
medical devices has been demonstrated in recent years by the
extensive litigation involving metal-on-metal total hip implants. The
patenting and regulatory evaluation processes must be modified so
that the utility and novelty of medical devices is established before
such devices receive intellectual property protection by the patent
process.

1

35 U. S. C. § 101 (2006).

2

35 U.S. C. § 102 (2011).

3

21 USC 360c (2017), Notes of Decisions “Premarket approval.”

4

Id.
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In order to realize the impact of this issue on society as a
whole and on the medical device manufacturing industry in
particular, one must understand the procedure of total hip
replacement (THR)5 and its related technology. This will be
reviewed first.
Armed with an understanding of the medical procedure and
the associated medical devices that are implanted in patients during
the process, the procedures for protecting the associated intellectual
property of the devices will next be reviewed.
Following this the regulatory evaluation process of the FDA
will be examined. Dissecting this process will demonstrate the
dichotomy that currently exists between the protection of intellectual
property afforded by the USPTO and the clinical evaluation
mechanism of the FDA.
Next, the recent litigation involving metal-on-metal hip
implants will be discussed with a particular emphasis on the
associated costs and societal impacts. Part of this discourse will
include a consideration of the policy arguments of the interplay
between intellectual property protection and the regulation and
evaluation of that property.
The discourse will conclude with consideration of the options
by which the process may be overhauled and with specific
recommendations on the best course of action.

This procedure, at times, will also be referred to as “total hip
arthroplasty” or “THA.”
5
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II. Total Hip Replacement Surgery History
The development of medical devices has had a dramatic
socioeconomic impact on the health of citizens of the United States.
The vast majority of these important discoveries have been
developed within the last one hundred years. One of the most
significant medical devices developed in the mid-twentieth century
is the modern, low-friction total hip arthroplasty. 6 It is one of the
few medical devices that has resulted in both an improvement in the
quality of life, due to decreased pain and increased activity for
patients as well as decreased mortality of patients when compared to
age matched controls of patients who have not undergone the
operation.7 The evolution of this operation and the associated
implantable medical devices has had a significant impact on the lives
of millions of individuals in the United States and around the world.

6

See JOHN CHARNLEY, LOW FRICTION ARTHROPLASTY
OF THE HIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Springer-Verlag 1979).
7

Jane Barrett et al, Survival Following Total Hip Replacement,
87(9), J Bone Joint Surg Am, September 2005 at 1965.
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Modern hip arthroplasty is generally attributed to the efforts
of the British surgeon Sir John Charnley in the early 1960’s. 8
Charnley’s hip design involved a metallic head articulating on a
plastic acetabular component. 9 About the same time Charnley was
developing a metal-on-plastic hip another designer, George McKee,
began developing hip arthroplasty components that utilized a metal
head articulating on a metal acetabular component. 10 This device
was patented in the United States in 1972. 11 The timing of these
developments—especially the efforts of George McKee--are
particularly important because they pre-date the advent of the
Medical Devices Act of 1976. Over the ensuing sixty years, there
has been an intensive debate about which of the types of components
is the safest and most effective.
During the last decade, extensive and expensive product
liability litigation of the metal-on-metal type of implant may have
effectively resolved this debate. 12

8

Stephen R. Knight, Randeep Aujla, and Satya Prasad Biswas, Total
Hip Arthroplasty – over 100 years of operative history, Orthop Rev.
v. 3(2), Sep. 6, 2011;
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3257425/.
JOHN CHARNLEY, supra note 12 at 41. Charnley’s initial hip
design actually used a Teflon acetabular component, but he
subsequently abandoned this bearing surface when it did not perform
as mechanically anticipated.
9

10

G. K. McKee, Development of Total Prosthetic Replacement of
the Hip, 72, Clin Orthop, September-October 1970, at 85.
11
12

U.S. Patent No. 3801989 A (filed Oct. 30, 1972).

See In Re: DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Products
Liability Litigation, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (MDL, 2010).
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A. Technology
Hip arthroplasty surgery is performed through one of several
surgical approaches in patients and takes about one and one-half
hours to accomplish. 13 During the process, the surgeon moves
between or cuts through the muscles of the hip, opens the capsule of
tissue around the hip, and dislocates or pops the ball of the upper
femur (head) out of the socket of the pelvis (acetabulum). The
femoral head is removed with a saw. The acetabulum is prepared
with a series of spherical, cheese-grater like instruments
progressively increasing in size. A type of roughened metal cup of
slightly greater size and typically made of titanium is impacted into
the acetabulum. The inner portion of the cup may then have a
surface inserted into it that is comprised of either high density
plastic, ceramic, or metallic cobalt-chrome alloy on which a new
femoral head will articulate. The upper femur is then prepared with a
series of instruments. A metallic stem most commonly made of
titanium and of appropriate size is inserted into the upper femur. The
stem typically has a bare neck on which is placed a head of one of
varying sizes that is comprised of either ceramic or of a cobaltchrome alloy.

13

For a complete discussion of the various surgical approaches to
the hip, see Stanley Hoppenfield, Piet Deboer, Surgical Exposures in
Orthopaedics: The Anatomic Approach, 302-357 J.B. Lippincott
Company, 1984.
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B. Current Technology
In 2016, the orthopaedic device industry generated revenue
of $48.1 billion, and a nearly $7 billion was specifically related to
implant hip arthroplasty components.14 Hip implant technology
revenue therefore accounts for approximately fifteen percent of the
total implant device market. Other sectors of the orthopedic device
implant market would include prosthetic joint implants such as total
knees, shoulders, and elbows; fracture fixation hardware such as
various plates, screws, and rods; and spinal stabilization hardware
such as pedicle screws, rods and fusion plate systems. There are
several reasons hip implants comprise this percentage of the market
and for similar reasons it is also expected that the hip implant market
will continue to grow.

14

Carolyn LaWell, Orthopaedic Industry Revenue Reaches $48.1
Billion, Orthoworld, Apr. 21, 2017,
https://www.orthoworld.com/index.php/publications/orthoknow_con
tent/orthopaedic-industry-revenue-reached-48-1-billion-worldwidein-20.
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First, it is estimated that the demand for total hip replacement
will continue to grow as a result of the general aging of the
population and the demand of the population to maintain an active
lifestyle. Epidemiological data has been difficult to harvest regarding
THR from a national perspective, since there is no mandatory total
joint arthroplasty registry as currently exists in other countries like
the United Kingdom. There is, however, an ongoing initiative for
developing a national Joint Registry Program. At this time, it is
currently voluntary. The program began in 2010 as a not-for-profit
501c(3) organization involving fifteen voluntarily participating
hospitals. 15 Only in 2016 was the registry recognized as such by the
American Association of Hip and Knee Surgeons (AAHKS), and as
of 2017 there were just over one million joint replacements being
tracked in the registry. 16 This presently accounts for one of seven
million calculated total hip and knee components currently
implanted in patients in the United States.17
Second, hip replacement surgery is increasingly being
performed in younger individuals who wish to maintain an active
and demanding lifestyle. When originally conceived and designed,
THR was primarily to be an operation for older individuals.
Currently, it is not uncommon for patients in their forties to undergo
joint replacement surgery.

15

See AMERICAN JOINT REPLACEMENT REGISTRY,
http://www.ajrr.net/about-us/about-our-organization/about-historymilestones (last visited on Apr. 19, 2018).
16
17

Id.

See Hilal Maradit Kremers et al, Prevalence of Total Hip and
Knee Replacement in the United States, 97, J Bone Joint Surg, Sept.
2, 2015, at 1386.
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Third, more complex revision hip surgery will be required
because individuals who are having their hips replaced are living
longer, and their lifespan is exceeding that of their replaced
prosthetic joints. This necessitates even more complex and
expensive revision or repeat joint replacement surgery. Again, the
actual epidemiological data are difficult to estimate, but when
considering the increases in primary (first) total hip replacements
and revision (re-do) total hip replacements, there is an expected
growth of 174 percent for primary total hip replacements and 137
percent for revision total hip replacements by the year 2030. 18
Fourth, in an effort to subvert the inevitable mechanical wear
properties of prosthetic hip components, the biomedical device
industry is attempting to develop strategies to decrease the wear of
implanted devices and to increase the lifespan of these same devices.
This has resulted in implant manufacturers seeking new technologies
to achieve this goal. These efforts have followed several pathways.
Manufacturers have sought to improve the manner in which
these various devices are fixed to the bone, and two basic
mechanisms exist to accomplish this. Either the components are
“cemented” into place utilizing a biomedical polymer known as
polymethylmethacrylate, or they are placed in “press-fit” fashion by
machining the femur or the acetabulum (or both) to a size slightly
smaller than the components that are implanted. The implanted
components are then pounded into place and initially held by the
mechanical interface between the bone and the metallic parts. When
“press-fit” fixation is utilized, the components are designed in such a
way that the bone will actually grow to the implanted devices over
an approximately six-week period.
Device manufacturers have sought to preserve the native
bone stock in patients by decreasing the size of implanted
components. This has resulted in a decrease in the amount of bone
removed at the index operation. The rationale is that by minimizing
the initial removal of bone at the index operation, more bone will be
preserved for future operations, should they become necessary.
18

A. Patel, G. Pavlou, R.E. Mujica-Mota, A.D. Toms, The
Epidemiology of Revision Total Knee and Hip Arthroplasty in
England and Wales, 97-B, Bone Joint J, July 29, 2015 at 1076.
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Finally, and most importantly for this discussion, implant
manufacturers have sought means by which to modify the bearing
surfaces of the parts that articulate and rub against each other in the
artificial hip joint. Bearing surfaces currently involve one of several
permutations: (1) a metal ball that articulates on a plastic liner within
the socket of the artificial hip joins: (2) a metal ball that articulates
on a metal socket within the socket of the artificial hip joint; (3) a
ceramic ball that articulates on a plastic bearing within the socket of
the artificial hip joint; and (4), a ceramic ball that articulates on a
ceramic bearing within the artificial hip joint. While some of these
various combinations are “new,” the history of how arthroplasty
developed is relevant to understanding the issue.
C. Economic Impact
It is anticipated that there will be a substantial increase in
both primary and revision THR as projected from the year 2005 to
the year 2030.19 As can be expected, this will result in a substantial
economic burden on the United States health care system.
Furthermore, from the current year to 2030, it is reasonable to
anticipate that there will be technological advances necessitating
intellectual property protection—most likely by way of the USPTO-as well as medical device regulation and approval by the FDA.

19

S. Kurtz, K. Ong, E. Lau, F. Mowat, and M Halpern. Projections
of Primary and Revision Hip and Knee Arthroplasty in the United
States from 2005 to 2030, 89(4), J Bone Joint Surg Am, April 1,
2007 at 780. Primary THR is expected to increase by 174 percent;
revision THR is expected to increase by 137 percent.
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The cost for the surgical event alone of total hip arthroplasty
is currently measured at approximately $30,000. For revision hip
arthroplasty it is $38,000 per event. 20 “The enormous growth in hip
arthroplasty may be justified by the fact that, despite its high cost,
total hip replacement (THR) is an extremely cost-effective treatment
intervention.21 As previously stated, THR is not simply a procedure
performed on the elderly. “The demand for THA in patients younger
than 65 years also is increasing, further increasing the disease burden
of revision THA.”22 Even more concerning is that all projections are,
at best, estimates, and are frequently underestimated in that the
“actual number of revision THAs in 2006 exceeded the projected
number of revision THA by >10,000 cases.” 23
These data all point to a significant growth in this area of the
healthcare market. They also likely indicate an increase in the
development of new technologies produced by manufacturers and
inventors who will have a vested interest in protecting their
intellectual property investments.
III. Utility and Novelty
A. History
In order to qualify for a patent, there has been a longstanding
requirement that a patent applicant must demonstrate that an
invention fulfills the requirements of novelty and utility. 24

20

See R. Bitton, The Economic Burden of Osteoarthritis, 15(8)
Amer Journ Man Care. 2009, at S233-235; see also J. N. Katz JN.
Total joint replacement in osteoarthritis 20(1), Best Pract Res Clin
Reheumatol, 2006 at 145.
21

Id.

22

Nho SJ et al, The Burden of Hip Osteoarthritis in the United
States: Epidemiologic and Economic Considerations. 21(Suppl)
JAAOS: 2013 at S1.
23

See id.; see also S. Kurtz, supra note 19.

24

Supra notes 1 and 2.
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The consideration of both novelty and utility as patent
requirements necessitates a historical review of these elements. As
the development of American jurisprudence is founded in the
traditions of English common law, so it is true that the authors of the
Constitution framed the concept of early United States patent law on
historical English precedents. 25 The earliest English concept of
patents was based on ad hoc, discretionary royal grants. These grants
from the Crown were initially focused on the development and the
furtherance of new aspects and avenues of trade and economic
growth. The protection of the rights of inventors was not considered
when the Crown was granting patents. 26 Early patents were not seen
as a “right” to intellectual property protection of an inventor.
“Petitions contained recitals of utility[,]” 27 but it was not until the
early seventeenth century that “the new common law thinking about
monopolies began to stress novelty as an essential element of lawful
patents . . . .”28 As British colonies were established in North
America, the patent system in the Colonies mirrored the system in
England. However, there was no unified patent system spanning the
early nation. Even after the Revolutionary War, the individual states
retained the rights to protect and regulate intellectual property, as
there were no provisions written into the Articles of Confederations.
It was not until 1789 that the “U.S. Constitution changed this
situation and laid the foundation for national patent and copyright
regimes.”29

25

Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas; The Intellectual Origins of American
Intellectual Property, 1790-1909 at 12-19 (Cambridge University
Press, 2016).
26

Id.

27

Id. at 17.

28

Id. at 18.

29

Id. at 47.
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The authors of the Constitution specifically enshrined what
was to become known as the “intellectual property clause” 30 in
Article I, Section 8, clause 8 whereby it was established that “The
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .”31 Utilizing its newly granted authority, Congress
passed the Patent Act of 1790. 32 The Patent Act provided for patents
of “any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used.” 33
The Patent Act of 1790 was later replaced by the 1836 Patent
Act which again stressed the requirements of utility and novelty;
furthermore, the 1836 Act established the “Patent Office [as] a
distinct and separate bureau in the Department of State . . . .” 34 This
and other types of intellectual property have been entrusted to the
United States Patent Trademark Office (USPTO). 35 The regulation
of these devices once invented, however, is currently under the
auspices of the Food and Drug Administration. 36 There is, at present,
a substantial disconnect between the legal framework under which
these the intellectual property of medical devices is protected by
patent law and subsequently approved for use in the public domain.
30

Id.

31

U. S. Const. Art 1, § 8, cl. 8.

32

SHELDON W. HALPERN, KENNETH L. PORT, SEAN B.
SEYMORE, FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 155-158, (Wolters Kluwer
5 ed. 2015); see also Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, I Stat. 100.
33

Id.

34

Id. at 157.

35

35 U.S.C. § 2 (2017).

36

21 U.S.C. § 301 (2017).
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In order to protect the intellectual property aspects of the
growing orthopaedic market, inventors have been relying on the
patent process to protect their economic interests.37 Countless
patents have been issued for orthopaedic implant designs, surgical
instruments used to insert the devices, and even for protective
clothing used while performing the procedure.38 Patents were sought
by Charnley and by George McKee for their pioneering implants in
the latter half of the twentieth century. 39 More recently, a Patent
Number U.S. 5904720 A was issued to Johnson & Johnson
Professional, Inc., the parent company of DePuy Orthopaedics, for a
hip joint prosthesis with a metal-on-metal articulation between the
prosthetic femoral head and the acetabular prosthetic component. 40
These are the types of components that were subsequently released
after regulatory approval as substantial equivalents for implantation
into patients worldwide.
Given recent events in the realm of medical devices, perhaps
it is time to re-evaluate how the intellectual property of these devices
is protected.

37

Supra note 1.

38

Supra note 6; U. S. Patent No. 3667456 A (filed Nov 19, 1970);
U. S. Patent No. 3625206 A (filed Nov 3, 1969).
39

See U. S. Patent No. 4327449 A (filed Jun 26, 1980); see also U.
S. Patent No. 5904720 A (filed Aug 12, 1997).
40

U. S. Patent No. U.S. 5904720 A (filed May 18, 1999).
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B. Current Statutory Structure of Novelty and Utility
1. Novelty
The current statutory language governing patent law has most
recently been updated in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of
2011.41 It requires that devices be, among other things, novel 42 and
useful.43
Specifically, the requirement for novelty indicates that a
patent may be granted to an individual unless the invention was
previously patented or described in a printed publication or was
available to the public commercially as set forth in the elements of
35 U.S.C § 102. The courts have upheld that “[d]esign patent
infringement occurs only when the accused design is ‘substantially
the same’ as the claimed design.” 44

41

P.L. 112-29, Sept 16, 2011, 125 STAT. 284.

42

35 U.S. C. § 102 (2011).

43

35 U. S. C. § 101 (2006).

44

Sun Hill Industries, Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc 48F. 3d 1193,
1196 (U.S.C.A, Fed Cir, 1995).
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When inventions are not new, they are said to be “anticipated
by prior art.”45 In order for prior art to defeat an alleged new
invention’s claim of novelty, three conditions must be fulfilled: (1)
the prior art’s invention date must pre-date the new invention
development; (2) the prior art must be strictly identified; and (3) the
prior art’s description must be “enabling”—that is, it must be
sufficiently described such that a person having ordinary skill in the
realm of the art described would be “enabled” to re-create the
invention.46 As will be discussed later, one of the critical aspects of
the recent production and sale of hip arthroplasty implants has been
a reliance on the FDA’s 510(k) process for approval. This process
provides for the approval of implants that have been previously
invented and are “substantially equivalent” to formerly approved
medical devices.47 If devices are determined to be “substantially
equivalent,” it raises the issue of how such devices would fulfill the
definition of novelty.
Novelty has been established from the earliest days of patent
legislation vis a vis the Patent Act of 1790, as an essential
requirement for an invention to receive a patent. Yet, the concept of
substantial equivalence for FDA regulatory purposes would seem to
contradict the element of novelty.
2. Utility
Analyzing the requirement for utility would appear to be
intuitive. Implantable hip devices would be seen to be useful if they
are capable of functioning as a prosthetic hip for an extended period
of time.

45

S. Halpern et al, supra 32 at 167.

46

S. Halpern et al, supra 32 at 167-69.

See 21 U.S.C. 360c (2017), Notes of Decisions “Premarket
approval.”
47
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When considering the requirement for utility as set forth in
35 U.S.C. § 101, courts have previously stated that the utility
threshold is not high and “an invention is ‘useful’ under section 101
if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.”48 In Brenner
v. Manson, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the concept of
utility has maintained a central place in all of our patent legislation
beginning with the first patent law in 1790 . . . .” 49 However, the
Court also acknowledged that “[a]s is so often the case, however, a
simple, everyday word can be pregnant with ambiguity when applied
to the facts of life.”50 Such is the essence of the debate regarding
“utility” when it comes to implantable, medical devices—
specifically in the realm of prosthetic hips.

48

Juicy Whip, Inc., v. Orange Bang, Inc, 185 F. 3d 13664, 1366,
(USCA, Fed. Cir, 1999).
49

Brenner v. Manson 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1965).

50

Id.
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The Brenner case involved debate about the regarding the
utility of a chemical process. There is no doubt that when the
Constitutional authors created the “intellectual property clause,”
such chemical processes did not exist. One must remember that the
tradition regarding patents had strong ties to the concept of
increasing aspects of trade.51 Certainly “machines” or “devices”
existed in Colonial America, but there is little doubt that the
concepts of such machines and devices had not extended to include
implantable prosthetic joints comprised of metal, plastic, and
ceramic. As biomedical technology progresses, the courts have faced
increasing challenges in determining what patented or patentable
inventions fulfill the statutory requirement of being useful. This is
readily demonstrated as the courts attempt to address the intellectual
property questions involving, for example, the technologies used for
testing, delineating, and manipulating human genetic sequences.
“Patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating
‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur,
invention’”52

51

O. Bracha, supra note 25.

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U. S.
576, 576 (2013) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. 566 U. S. 66 (2012)).
52
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Modern implantable medical devices can be said to be useful
if they are safe, if they achieve their desired clinical result, and if
that clinical result is at least as successful as or preferably more
successful than currently existing clinical technology. Yet here
again, the simple word “safe” is an example of a word “pregnant
with ambiguity when applied to the facts of everyday life.” 53 Justice
Story stated in Lowell v. Lewis that “[a]ll that the law requires, is that
the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being,
good policy, or sound morals of society.” 54
In the realm of orthopaedic prosthetic hip implants, these
determinations can be difficult to establish at the time of patent
application. Typically patents are applied for and granted after their
invention in order to protect the intellectual property of the inventor.
However, such patents are granted for devices prior to their
evaluation for safety and efficacy by the Food and Drug
Administration. In the case of prosthetic total joint implants, once
the FDA grants approval for their use, they are released to market
and are available for surgical implantation. Inventors, whether they
are clinical physicians or implant manufacturing companies, have an
interest in obtaining patents to protect their intellectual property and
then delivering their products to market as quickly as possible in
order to generate revenue to recover their costs for research and
development and to please their shareholders.

53
54

Brenner, 383 U. S. at 529.

Lowell v. Lewis 1 Mason 182 Circuit Court, D. Mass 15 F. Cas
1018, 1019 (1817).
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In reality, the true evaluation for safety and efficacy begins
once these types of medical devices reach the medical marketplace.
Patients receiving prosthetic hip implants are counselled by prudent
orthopaedic surgeons that their implant is a mechanical device and,
like all mechanical devices, can wear out and need to be redone at
some point in the future. A total hip patient in the United States
could generally expect a ninety percent chance that their total hip
would last between ten and fifteen years. 55
When examining the recent events surrounding certain hip
implants, it becomes obvious that certain devices were granted
patents that were of questionable usefulness because their safety was
suspect due to early clinical failures and due to a need for early
revision surgery. Furthermore, when examining the process by
which these types of devices were cleared by the FDA, their novelty
may also be considered suspect.
IV. FDA Origins and Authority Approval Process
A. Origins and Authority
It is important to understand the origins of Food and Drug
Administration when considering the evolution of its relationship
with the USPTO. Additionally, this relationship has historically
resulted in the regulation of medical devices.

55

Jeffrey N. Katz, MD, MSc et al, Failures of Total Hip
Replacement: A Population-Based Perspective, ORTHO J HARV
MED SCHOOL, Vol 9, Manuscripts, 103.
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The United States Patent and Trade Office and the Food and
Drug Administration share a common heritage dating back to 1848.
It was around this time that chemist Lewis Caleb Beck was assigned
to the Patent Office to perform chemical testing on agricultural
products, and this function was subsequently assumed under the
Division of Chemistry and later the Bureau of Chemistry of the
United States Department of Agriculture in 1862. 56 The passage of
the Federal Food and Drugs Act, in 1906, “added regulatory
functions to the agency’s scientific mission[,]” and was the
beginning of the development of the modern Food and Drug
Administration which was established by the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 57 The FDA currently operates under the
direction of the Department of Health and Human Services. 58
As part of its function, the Food and Drug Administration has
been granted authority to regulate medical devices under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 59 This authority is based in the
“constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce”
and to protect the public health “to the end that public health and
safety might be advanced. 60 Prior to 1976, both pharmaceutical
agents and medical devices were regulated together in the same
fashion under the auspices of the FDA.
B. The Medical Device Amendments

56

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ (last visited
on Apr. 19, 2018).
57

Vincent A. Kleinfeld, Legislative History of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 65, 65-100, 1995.
58

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124
403.htm (last visited on Apr. 19, 2018).
59

21 U.S.C. §301, Chapter 9, Subchapter V—Drugs and Devices.

60

21 U.S.C. §301, Note 1 (2017).
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In 1976, the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) were
adopted to specifically address issues related to the safety,
regulation, and marketing of medical devices.61 In order to address
issues specifically related to medical devices, the MDA subdivided
various medical devices into three classes. The types and
requirements of Class I, Class II, and Class III devices are set forth
in 21 U.S.C. § 360c. Surgically implanted hip arthroplasty
components are Class III devices as outlined in 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)
and are subject to the highest level of FDA regulation.
Since its inception as a one-person department in the
USPTO, the FDA has operated under various federal departments to
assess the safety of medical devices available to the public. Later,
the FDA was granted regulatory authority with ability to classify
medical devices and to require manufacturers to demonstrate
medical device safety prior to public marketing of such devices.
C. Avenues of Approval for Medical Devices
Since the MDA of 1976, the FDA has allowed medical
device approval by one of two pathways: (1) the premarket approval
process (PMA); and (2) the 510(k) approval process. The first is a
prospective analysis. The second is a retrospective analysis based on
“substantial equivalence.”

61

See Pub. L. 94-295 May 28, 1976; see also 21 U.S.C. §360 (2017).
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In general, devices that do not fall under Class I or Class II,
that are “purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or
sustaining human life,” and that “present a potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury” are “ subject . . . to premarket approval to
provide reasonable assurance of [] safety and effectiveness.”62 Class
III devices require Premarket Approval whereby a device’s safety is
assessed prior to its release to the medical community for use and
distribution to the public.63 In addition, new medical devices that
seek approval through PMA “require[] an investigational new device
(IND) application and a small safety trial . . . . The trials are typically
randomized, can cost millions of dollars, and can require several
years to complete.”64 However, an exception is provided for under
Section 360(c) when a device had been approved prior to the MDA,
and the device is “grandfathered” by a provision allowing pre-1976
devices to remain on the market. 65

62

See 21 U.S.C., § 360(c) (2017): see also 21 U.S.C. 360(e) (2017).

63

21 USC 360c (2017).

64

Travis Maak, James Wylie, Medical Device Regulation: A
Comparison of the United States and the European Union, 24(3),
JAAOS, May, 2016.
65

Id.
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In order to “prevent manufacturers of grandfather devices
from monopolizing the market while new devices clear PMA,” the
FDA allows devices to be approved for use by a separate process
known as the 510(k) process.66 The 510(k) process does not require
clinical testing and reporting of results to the FDA prior to medical
device approval for use. Instead, under 510(k) approval, a device is
determined to be “substantially equivalent” to a device that had been
approved prior to 1976, and consequently such a device may be
approved for use without undergoing the more rigorous PMA
process. 67
The ability to obtain 510(k) approval has provided a means
by which inventors and developers of hip arthroplasty components
may introduce new devices in order to gain access to the 48.1 billion
dollar orthopaedic implant device market without having to invest in
the more lengthy and expensive clinical trial process prior to FDA
approval for use.
The current patent process provides the device developers a
means by which they may protect their intellectual property in this
potentially lucrative aspect of the medical device market.
As noted above, the 510(k) approval process requires
significantly less time than the PMA process. Consequently,
inventors will have their intellectual property investment protected
for a longer time because patent protection will not have been
consumed while waiting for market approval by the FDA. The Court
noted in Medtronic v. Lohr that the PMA review and the 510(k)
notification demonstrate significant time requirements with “1,200
hours necessary to complete a PMA review, [while] the § 510(k)
review is completed in an average of only 20 hours.” 68

66

See supra note 47

67

Id.

68

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996).
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The 510(k) approval process is substantially less expensive to
manufacturers. “The mean cost from concept to approval reported in
an industry survey was $31 million for devices approved through the
510(k) process and $94 million for devices approved through PMA .
. . .”69
In an effort to prevent monopolization and the attendant
increase in healthcare cost, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act
in 1984.70 This effort produced a means by which pharmaceutical
manufacturers of generic drugs could “seek approval through
establishing bioequivalence to a previously approved pioneer
drug.”71 The Hatch-Waxman Act, however, did not extended an
abbreviated approval process to medical devices. 72 The Act,
however, did provide a possibility for patent extension for both new
drugs and for new medical devices in order to offset the time of
patent protection lost while FDA approval is sought, and this has
further been verified by the Supreme Court. 73

69

See T. Maak, supra note 65; see also J. Makeower, A. Meer, L.
Denend, FDA impact on U.S. medical technology innovation: A
survey of over 200 medical technology companies. Washington, DC,
Advanced Medical Technology Association, 2010.
HTTP://advamed.org/res.download/30.
70

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in
sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
Brian P. Wallenfelt, “Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices,”
WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1407, 1415 (2014).
71

72
73

Id.at 1418.

See Id. at 1419; see also Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc. 496 U.S. 661
(1990).
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From a public policy perspective, there are two main
considerations. First is the interest of the federal government via the
FDA in insuring the public release of medical devices with the safest
and most efficacious clinical profile to the public. Medical devices
that are safe and efficacious—that is, devices that provide utility—
will provide for the maintenance and improvement of the public’s
health at the least cost to government and to the commercial
insurance industry. Devices that are safe and efficacious will likely
require the least long term clinical surveillance because their long
term safety will have been established. Furthermore, such devices
will require the least amount of ongoing medical corrective
intervention because the predictability of their long term clinical
profile will have demonstrated the least need for future intervention.

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

331

Second, the policy of the federal government is to encourage
competition to minimize monopolization of the market.
Monopolization is likely to result in domination of the medical
device market by a few larger manufacturers that have the resources
to pursue the more expensive and lengthy PMA process. 74 In passing
the Hatch-Waxman Act, the federal government’s desire to
encourage competition and decrease cost was codified by facilitating
the development of the generic drug market. This particular desire
was not, through the Act, extended to the medical device market,
although patent extension was extended to medical devices. 75 As
noted in Wallenfelt’s article, there is a significant cost differential
regarding the development, testing, and manufacture of
pharmaceutical agents as compared to medical devices. With
pharmacological agents the majority of the expense is related to the
research, development, and testing of the agents. Once approval is
granted, the actual manufacturing cost represents only a small
portion of a company’s expense. In contradistinction, medical device
manufactures of complex, Class III medical devices, have a
significantly larger cost burden with manufacturing the devices.
While development and testing—be it via the PMA process or the
510(k) process—can require significant financial investment,
ongoing manufacturing costs remain a substantial burden to the
manufacturer. This is true whether the manufacturer is the initial
developer or is a subsequent generic manufacturer. Consequently,
the generic manufacture does not realize as substantial a cost
reduction in assuming the production of previously developed and
approved devices.76

74

Wallenfelt, supra note 71 at 1422.

75

Id. at 1422.

76

Id.
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The introduction of the PMA the 510(k) processes was an
attempt to balance the FDA’s insurance of utilitarian medical
devices via established safe and effective clinical profile against the
government’s and the public’s interest in attempting to minimize the
cost burden to federal and commercial payers and, eventually, to the
public. As subsequent discussion will demonstrate, the outcome of
the steps taken can likely be viewed as having the opposite,
unintended effects.
D. The Intellectual Property Protection Problem With
510(k) Approval
Two significant issues arise with the patent requirements for
novelty and usefulness as applied to medical devices.

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

333

As noted above, the first problem inventors face is that
temporally, FDA approval is sought after patent application. This
creates two problems for inventors and for the USPTO. The first
problem is that inventors creating medical devices still are required
to obtain FDA approval before their inventions can be released in the
marketplace. As previously mentioned, either the PMA process or
the 510(k) process are the regulatory avenues that would potentially
be utilized for medical devices, and there is no other streamlined
mechanism for devices as there is for generic drugs provided by the
Hatch-Waxman Act.77 When assessing hip implant devices, the
PMA process is particularly onerous because PMA requires clinical
trials, and clinical trials for hip implants could go on for several
years prior to determining the true safety and efficacy of using
certain components. Early implant failures detectable in a short
survey would not necessarily be related to failure of the function of
the prosthetic implants themselves. Rather, early failures would be
more likely related to surgical morbidity and mortality—including
events such as periprosthetic joint infection, thromboembolic events
such as deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, and
postoperative patient death due to comorbid conditions such as
coronary and carotid arterial disease. Hip replacement survivability
of the implants themselves is typically assessed in short, medium,
and long term implant survival which roughly could be divided into
two, five, and ten or more years. Occurrences such as excessive
bearing wear, host response osteolysis, galvanic trunionosis, and
implant loosening from bony fixation may not manifest during the
initial year or two of early clinical trial. 78 All the while during such
clinical trials the clock is ticking as to the lifetime of a patent that
protects a developer’s investment. Patent terms typically are granted
for periods of twenty years from the time of patent application. 79 If
PMA is employed and long term studies are utilized, more than half
of a patent’s life could be consumed before any return on investment
is realized by inventors and developers. The Supreme Court noted in
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic that “if the discovery relates to a
product that cannot be marketed without substantial testing . . . the
‘clock’ on his patent term will be running even though he is not yet
able to derive any profit from the invention.” 80 Even though the
Hatch-Waxman Act made provision for extending a patent for
medical devices in compensation for time lost awaiting regulatory
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approval, the combined period for such extension when combining
time awaiting regulatory approval and remaining patent term shall
not exceed fourteen years. 81
The second problem is that if the USPTO grants a patent
under these circumstances, it does so without truly determining
whether a device is useful, because the FDA has not yet deemed it to
be safe.
The Patent Office and certain jurisdictions have held that a
medical invention, to be patentable, must be shown safe and actually
effective by the performance of clinical tests on humans. A second
theory, which is now firmly rooted in the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA), is that a showing of safety . . . is not
necessary to satisfy the statutory requirement . .
. .82

77

See Robert A. Armitage, The Hatch-Watchman [sic] Act: A Path
forward for Making It More Modern WILLIAM MITCHELL L.
REV. 1200-1259 (2014) for discussion of this issue.
78

Osteolysis is a condition whereby (whereby a patient develops
large cysts in the bone around an implant because of response to
microscopic wear particles); galvanic trunionosis is a condition
whereby (whereby electromagnetic currents between metal
components of differing types cause metallic corrosion)
79

35 U.S.C 154(a)(2) 2017

80

Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 596 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1990)

81

35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3).

82

C. Leon Kim, The Utility Requirement for Patenting Therapeutic
Inventions, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 595, 612 (1975)
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The Supreme Court has previously ruled that “any decision
by the FDA on the safety and effectiveness of a new drug is
irrelevant to the issue of patentability. 83 Pharmaceutical evaluation,
however, evolves differently than evaluation for medical devices in
that the majority of drugs do not have cumulative effects, so their
safety and efficacy can be more readily evaluated in shorter term
clinical trials than the long term surveillance need to assess medical
device performance. Other drugs, such as Adriamycin, have dosedependent effects that are cumulative and require longer terms of
assessment similar to the evaluation of medical devices. 84
Furthermore, these types of judicial decisions were made primarily
related to the use of pharmaceutical agents. They were made at a
time before the widespread implantation of prosthetic joint implants
in large segments of the population. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Brenner was decided in 1965, at a time when total hip replacement
was in its earliest stages of development. In 2010, 310,000 total hip
replacement procedures were performed, and it is estimated that
there are approximately 2.5 million implanted total hip replacements
in the United States.85
The second problematic consideration is how the 510(k)
approval process relates to the novelty requirement of patents
embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 102. The 510(k) approval process is
employed to bypass the FDA’s PMA requirement. When applying
for 510(k) approval, a device is claimed to be “substantially
equivalent” to a device previously approved by the FDA.

83

Id. at 596; see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); see also
Application of Hartop 311 F. 2d 249, 257 (C.C.P.A 1962).
84

Adriamycin is a chemotherapy agent that may be used for
treatment of breast cancer.
85

Maradit Kremers, et al, Prevalence of Total Hip and Knee
Replacement in the United States, J BONE JOINT SURG AM, 2015
Sep 2, 97(17), 1386-97.
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This generates two issues for consideration. First, if a device
is substantially equivalent, then does it truly fulfill the novelty
requirement of § 102? Perhaps one needs to the look to third
statutory requirement introduced by the Patent Act of 1952 to
establish patentability—the requirement of non-obviousness.86 The
non-obvious subject matter requirement specifically states that “if
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed inventions
pertains.”87 The requirements of utility, set forth in § 101, and
novelty, set forth in § 102, have been longstanding elements of
patentability dating back to the passage of the Patent Act of 1790.
However, the concept of novelty was further delineated with the
addition of the requirement of non-obvious subject matter. Though
non-obviousness was codified in 1952, there is a long judicial
history of the application of the Hotchkiss test stemming from the
1851 Supreme Court decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How.
248, 13 L. Ed. 683.88

86

The current variation is found in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).

87

35 U.S. C. § 103 (2011).

88

See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 684,
687-695 (1966) for J. Clark’s discussion of the evolution of this
judicial precedent and its eventual embodiment in the Patent Act of
1952.
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The Hotchkiss test informally established in 1851 states that
“unless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
there was an absence of that skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention.” 89 The non-obviousness
requirement, then, further delineates the novelty requirement such
that “[a]n invention which has been made, and which is new in the
sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be
patentable . . . .”90

89

See Id. at 684, 690; see also Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How.
248, 267, 13 L. Ed. 683.
90

Graham, at 692.

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

338

The result of the current scheme is that implant
manufacturers are currently designing and seeking patents for new
variations of total hip implants claiming they are useful, fulfilling the
§ 101 requirement, novel, fulfilling the § 102 requirement, and nonobvious, fulfilling the § 103 requirement. The manufacturers are
then taking their patented designs to the FDA and pursuing 510(k)
approval based on arguments of substantial equivalence. They are
claiming that the newly designed or modified implants are similar
enough to those previously approved and consequently should be
granted FDA 510(k) approval. This is all done with the intention of
protecting the intellectual property investment in time and in capital
with the limited monopoly of a patent, but avoiding the time,
expense, and prolonged consumption of patent protection by the
onerous PMA approval process.
Historically, substantially equivalent devices have been
approved by the FDA based on devices that were previously
approved. However, there are instances where medical devices have
been subsequently voluntarily withdrawn or voluntarily recalled by
manufacturers because of poor clinical performance of the devices or
because of safety concerns. The quintessential example of this is the
recent activity surrounding the ASR metal-on-metal hip
manufactured by DePuy. 91 The ASR hip was approved for sale in
the United States by the FDA in July, 2008 based on a 510(k)
clearance application. This application was based, among others, on
U. S. Patent No. US 5904720 A. 92 In September, 2008, the
Australian Orthopaedic Association National Joint Replacement
Registry was reporting that this device had a significantly higher
than expected revision rate. 93 DePuy recalled the device voluntarily
in 2009 in Australia for “declining demand.” 94 The National Joint
Registry of England and Wales reported in 2010 that the five-year
revision rate for this device was five times higher than for all other
devices combined at thirteen percent, and as a result of the data from
England and Wales, DePuy completely withdrew the product from
the world market in 2010.

91

See Brent M. Ardaugh, et. al. The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-onMetal Hip Implant, N ENGL J MED 368:2, pp 97-100, Jan 10, 2013.
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It is a quirk of law that allows devices to be evaluated for
510(k) approval by the FDA, as long as the substantially equivalent
predicates have not been withdrawn from the market because of
court order or because of FDA directed recall. 95
Inherent in the nature of the 510(k) approval process for
these various metal-on metal hip implants is the introduction of the
issue referred to as “predicate creep.” Predicate creep can readily
occur during the 510(k) process when each new device is changed
slightly as compared to its previously approved predicate substantial
equivalent. As each new substantially equivalent device is slightly
altered and submitted for approval, the result can be, after several
permutations, that the current device submitted as a substantial
equivalent bears little resemblance to the original parent device. This
is precisely the problem demonstrated in the current generation of
metal-on-metal hip arthroplasties. 96

92

See supra note 63.

93

Ardaugh, supra note 90.

94

Id. at 98.

Institute of Medicine, Medical devices and the public’s health: the
FDA 510(k) clearance process at 35 years, Washington DC:
National Academies Press, 2011.
95

96

See Arianne Freeman, Predicate Creep: The Danger of Multiple
Predicate Devices, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE 127, 2014.
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In a 2014 article, Arianne Freeman actually advocates for
complete elimination of the 510(k) approval process, arguing that the
process “shifts device testing from the clinical trial setting to the
public market place, thus unethically veering potential risks to the
patients.”97 In fact, “Congress had always intended class III devices
to undergo PMA, and in 1990, it directed the [FDA] to establish a
schedule to finish the transition to PMAS for all devices that were to
remain in class III,” but the FDA had, as of December 2012, not
completed the transition requested by Congress.98
In more recent developments, however, the FDA has
instructed prosthetic hip manufacturers that they must seek
premarket approval for metal-on-metal hip components with
acetabular components held to the bone either by bone cement or
held in press-fit fashion. This order went into effect in February,
2016.99
Congress and the FDA have indicated that there is an
increasing desire to eliminate the 510(k) approval process because of
the inherent problems discussed above regarding substantial
equivalence and the potential development of predicate creep. 100
What has not been addressed, however, is the disconnect created by
granting a patent based on utility, novelty, and non-obviousness to a
medical device that is subsequently submitted for FDA approval
based on substantial equivalence to a predicate device.
V. Economic Impact of ASR Hip Recalls
97

Id.; see Deborah Cohen, How safe are metal-on-metal hip
implants?, 1(4) BRIT. MED. J., Feb. 28, 2012,
http://www.bm.com/content/344/bmj.e1410.pdf%2Bhtml
[hereinafter How safe are metal-on-metal hip implants?].
98

See Ardaugh, supra note 90; see also Freeman, supra note 95.

99

U. S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedure
s/ImplantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241769.ht
m (last visited on Apr. 19, 2018).
100

Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 95.
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The voluntary recalls of the ASR hip by DePuy and of other
metal-on-metal hips has resulted in extended product liability
litigation and an enormous economic burden to society and to the
medical device manufacturing community. The large numbers of
product liability related lawsuits have placed a large burden on the
United States judicial system.
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As a result of the clinical failures of the ASR hip and the
subsequent voluntary recalls by Johnson & Johnson, DePuy’s parent
company, multiple product liability lawsuits were filed. Many of the
plaintiffs’ cases have been consolidated either into multidistrict
litigation or into class action lawsuits. 101 Furthermore, a search on
one of the online legal services for “DePuy ASR” will result in
multiple citations for various pending or resolved actions across the
country. While the actual number of plaintiffs is difficult to
ascertain, approximately 10,000 individuals in two different
settlements will recover just over four billion dollars. 102 While this is
an estimated settlement cost to DePuy, this figure does not take into
account the other millions of dollars spent across the country in
pursuit of these legal actions. Furthermore, it does not take into
consideration the countless hours of time spent by attorneys for both
sides, judges and their staffs, and the actions required by the various
plaintiffs and defendant representatives. The actual expenses
including various lost wages and pain and suffering costs could
extend into the tens of billions of dollars.

101

See, eg. 13 No. 8 Westlaw Journal Nursing Home 8, October 8,
2010, California Man Files Class Suit Over Recalled Depuy Hip
Implants; see also, eg U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
MDL Statistics Report-Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by
District (Sept. 16, 2017)
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Docke
ts_By_District-September-15-2017.pdf.
102

Barry Meier, Maker Aware of 40% Failure in Hip Implant, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/business/jj-study-suggestedhip-device-could-fail-in-thousands-more.html; see also Jef Feeley
and David Voreacos, J & J Said to Reach $4 Billion Deal to Settle
Hip Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2013),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-12/j-j-said-toreach-4-billion-deal-to-settle-hip-lawsuits.
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One must remember that the ASR hip recall and its resultant
litigation was only one of several recalls involving either different
manufacturers, such as Stryker or Zimmer, or other product lines
belonging to DePuy, such as the Pinnacle hip which is also
manufactured by DePuy. The Minneapolis Star Tribune reported that
Stryker had reached a $1.4 billion settlement in a separate but related
lawsuit involving a different type of metal-on-metal articulation
between the femoral stem and the femoral neck of hip implants. 103
While hip implant manufacturers may have been able to
decrease costs by pursuing 510(k) approval instead of PMA
approval, it would appear that the rush to get implants to market for
competition purposes has resulted in a substantially larger cost to the
manufacturers than would have otherwise been realized.
Furthermore, the actions of the device manufacturers effectively
created a large unmonitored clinical trial that shifted the burden and
the risk to the population of individuals requiring a total hip
arthroplasty.
VI. Public Policy Considerations
Given the unfortunate events surrounding this regulation,
implantation, and subsequent recall of the DePuy’s ASR hip, the
natural inclination and visceral response would be to try to effect
changes that would prevent a similar occurrence in the future. This
is, perhaps, more easily suggested than accomplished.
The Constitutional history of the United States and the
legislative history of Congress have confirmed that the protection of
intellectual property rights via Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, as well
as the availability of transient, limited monopolies through the patent
process, enumerated in the most recent America Invents Act, will be
preserved. If inventors and scientists and industry are disincentivized to be innovative, then it is likely that progress in
medical device development will diminish.

103

Joe Carlson, $1.4 billion settlement announced in artificial hip
litigation, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 14, 2014),
http://www.startribune.com/nov-3-1-4-billion-settlement-inartificial-hip-litigation/281375461/.
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That being said, some form of regulation and safety
assessment still needs to be performed whether by a governmental
agency such as the FDA or by some other private entity to ensure
that medical devices that are made available to the public are safe
and effective. No regulatory scheme will be able to prevent
mechanical failures of medically implanted prosthetic devices such
as total hip arthroplasty components. As a result of the events
involving the ASR and other metal-on-metal hips, the FDA has
abolished the 510(k) mechanism and mandated PMA evaluation for
certain types of hips with metal-on-metal bearings. 104 While this
action may result in more thorough, short term clinical evaluation
with the potential for increased safety for the public, it is likely to
have two other effects. First it is likely to deter scientists and
manufacturers involved in the development of prosthetic hips from
pursuing research along these lines—especially when considering
the price tag of the evolving litigation relating to such implants.
Second, should scientists and developers pursue this “useful art”, the
costs of research, regulatory approval and defense against potential
litigation are likely to prove to be significantly more, if not
prohibitively expensive. As is true in the nature of business
transactions, this will result in the cost being passed along to the
consumer, be it to the individual patient or to a corporate consumer
such as a health care system or the federal government.

104

See supra note 100.
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It is a knee-jerk response to suggest that previously
developed and marketed technologies that have fallen by the
wayside due to suboptimal performance should be altogether
abandoned. The history of total joint arthroplasty specifically, and
or orthopaedic surgery in general is comprised of similar procedures
or technology that were not initially successful, were buried in the
archives of history, and were subsequently resurrected in new,
modified, more successful versions. For example, THA was
previously associated with a disturbingly high infection rate as well
as an unacceptable rate of hip instability, whereby the hip would
dislocate from the socket after surgery. Multiple aspects of the
procedure are notable for its success, but progressive technological
developments have all contributed to the extreme success of the
operation105—so much so that it was dubbed the “operation of the
century.”106 If some of the regulatory processes had been made more
stringent, and if some of the intellectual property protective benefits
had been eliminated, it is unlikely that the success of the operation
would have developed and advanced as much as it has in the last
fifty years.
VII. Possible Solutions to the Conundrum
Unravelling this spiderweb of overlapping regulation,
unintended consequences, and seemingly conflicting purposes is not
easy. There are, however, some solutions to propose.

105

Important developments in THA include use of perioperative
antibiotics, use of laminar flow operating rooms with special air
handling characteristics, shorter operative times, smaller, less
invasive incisions, and implant modification involving less invasive
implants with more physiologically sized femoral heads.
106

I.D. Learmonth ID, C. Young, C. Rorabeck, The Operation of the
Century: Total Hip Replacement, 370(9597) LANCET, Oct. 27,
2007 7:370(9597): 1508-19.
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While monopolies have been distasteful—both to our English
legal ancestors as manifested in the no Monopolies act, and to the
Patent Office from its earliest days with Thomas Jefferson, 107 it may
be necessary to extend the length of patent protection. Justice Story
commented in Graham in 1966 “Technology [] has advanced—and
with remarkable rapidity in the last fifty years. Moreover, the ambit
of applicable art in given fields of science has widened by
disciplines unheard of half a century ago.” 108 Perhaps this advent of
these new and previously unheard of technologies will necessitate an
overhauling of the patent system more equipped to handle the
complexities of this previously unheard of applicable art.
One possibility would be to develop a tiered patent system
that grants patents of varying lengths—for example twenty, thirtyfive, and fifty years—to accommodate the complexity of obtaining
more thorough regulatory evaluation and testing.
Another option would be to develop patent tracts for the
various classes of medical devices such that items in Class I are
evaluated for patents in a different fashion or with different criteria
than Class III medical devices, which would be evaluated with a
different set of criteria or different time frame.
Another way to manage this would be to delay the patent
process or modify it until after the regulatory evaluation is
completed. Pre-patent protection could still be provided by an
application process that provides public notice to the scientific and
manufacturing communities that prior art has been established. The
potential limitation to this is that inventors and manufacturers are
unlikely to invest the larger sums of money that will be required of
product research, development and testing without the assurance that
their intellectual property would be protected.
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See Halpern, supra note 32; see also Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 684, 688 where J. Clark noted
“Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion to
monopolies.”
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Graham at 694.
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The USPTO could review and grant patents that have
fulfilled the requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obvious subject
matter, but the lifetime of the patent could only be counted upon the
technology’s completion of its regulatory approval process.
One way to solve the seeming conflict between requiring
safety to fulfill the usefulness criteria of § 102 is to pursue a
regulatory process similar to that currently in use in Europe. The
European equivalence of the FDA’s PMA process is the CE mark
(Conformite Europeenne) which allows a medical device to be
marketed in all European countries. 109 The CE mark requires proof
of the device’s performance, whereas US FDA approval of a PMA
application requires proof of the device’s safety and efficacy.110 This
would avoid the perceived conflict of requiring the establishment of
safety to provide for utility and would be in conformity with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brenner. One caveat is that given some
of the recent high-profile device failures in the European Union, the
European Union appears to be moving more toward a regulatory
system reflecting that provided by the FDA. 111
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T. Maak, J. Wylie, supra note 65.
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Id.; DB Kramer, S Xu, and AS Kesselheim, Regulation of
Medical Devices in the United States and European Union, N ENGL
J MED 2012: 366(9): 848-855.
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D. Kramer, et. al. supra note 109.
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Yet another means of resolving this perceived conflict would
be for developers of medical devices to abandon pursuing patent
protection of their intellectual property. Instead, they could pursue
trade secret protection. “An innovator might choose to protect
information or an invention via trade secret instead of patent law
because a trade secret holder will never have to disclose the
information ‘as long as the information remains secret and meets
other judicial criteria allowing for the preservation of its
secrecy.’”112 Because there is no defined longevity of trade secret
effectiveness, the length of time for FDA PMA approval would not
be as restrictive to the potential lucrativeness of developing medical
devices requiring long clinical trials. The downside to this proposal
is the resulting introduction of another entirely separate statutory
scheme under the Economic Espionage Act and the associated
Defend Trade Secrets Act. 113
A somewhat “Modest Proposal” 114 would be to either
eliminate the function of the USPTO patentability requirements or
the FDA’s watchdog function. While this may give cause for great
rejoicing among some members of the medical community, they
would still have to admit begrudgingly that the FDA serves an
essential function in safeguarding the health of U.S. citizens.
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Robin J Effron, Trade Secrets, Extraterritoriality, and
Jurisdiction, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 767, (Fall 2016);
and Robin J. Effron, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Application
of the Economic Espionage Act and the TRIIPS Agreement, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1476-77 (2003).
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18 U.S.C §§ 1831 and 1839 (1996).

Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposal: For Preventing The Children
of Poor People in Ireland From Being a Burden to Their Parents or
Country, and For Making Them Beneficial to the Public, (1729).
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Perhaps the best solution involves a two-pronged change to
the regulation of these types of implantable devices and their
associated protection as intellectual property under patent law. First,
the FDA should subdivide Class III devices into, say, Class IIIA and
Class IIIB devices and require all Class III devices to undergo PMA.
Class IIIA would be those devices that can have their clinical safety
established relatively quickly under PMA—within, say, twenty-four
months. Class IIIB would be those devices that take longer than
twenty-four months to establish clinical safety by pre-market
analysis.
The current patent structure would remain the same for Class
IIIA devices. However, for Class IIIB devices, the patent structure
could be modified such that the patent is applied for with the
initiation of the pre-market analysis for the device, but the actual
granting of the twenty-year patent protection occurs only upon
completion of pre-market analysis be it at two, five, or however
many years.
There are several benefits to this proposal. First, the clinical
devices that require a longer time to establish clinical safety, and
therefore usefulness, would all undergo PMA rather than 510(k)
FDA approval. Second, inventors would be assured their inventions
would receive patent protection for a full twenty years. Finally, from
a public policy perspective, patients could be assured that the
implants with which they are treated have undergone the more
rigorous PMA establishment of clinical safety, and the nation and
economy would benefit by encouraging designers to pursue the
development of such implants for the benefit of the populace with
the knowledge that their intellectual property would be protected for
the full patent term.
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